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I 
1 The 1950s have been seen as a period of extension and consolidation of central state 
control rather than a period of implementation of a "grand plan" of apartheid. 1 
I While in agreement with such a general view, the paper argues that a discussion of 
I the state must be grounded in an account of the struggles through which such control 
I was achieved. The apartheid policiss of the National Party generated considerable 
I resistance within the state itself. Elected on a minority of the popular vote, 
ruling by virtue of a coalition in parliament, without experience as a governing 
party, facing opposition-controlled councils in the largest cities, the NP 
I Government had to put its own house in order. To date, there has been little 
understanding of the contours of opposition within the state, nor how it was 
overcome. 
l 
I In examining the application of the Group Areas Act to Uitenhage, the paper takes up one particular venue of conflict between the central state and a 
1 municipality over policy towards Africans and Coloureds in the 1950s and early 
1960s. The conflicts waged there were symptomatic of efforts by the central state 
l to asswne control over the reproduction of the urban black working class, and of the 
l contradictory and uneven results achieved. Despite "consolidating and extending the 
I ambit of (its) control", the state was unable to remake the world as it wished. 
Introduction 
The institutional means available to the central state to enforce the new apartheid 
policies forced it to rely on relatively undependable local authorities as essential 
sites of delivery of services and exercise of control. Local authorities were 
nominally responsible for maintaining immediate conditions of accumulation for 
industry and commerce, and for reproduction of the white as well as black working 
classes. These tasks were conducted, if not more commonly avoided, under severe 
structural limitations of dependence on white ratepayers. As the decade passed the 
Government eroded municipal fiscal and policy independence even further. 
But if the NP government ruled through these local institutions, they 
could not dictate to them. Local constituencies heavily shaped municipal responses 
to central policies, and local officials varied widely in their ability or 
willingness to comply, especially within UP strongholds. A political process of 
accommodation was necessary, though, it will be argued, increasingly on terms 
defined by the central state. Local compliance with government initiatives was not 
a mere function of structural factors or reaction to the storm of repression after 
Sharpeville; it was alsg the result of a rough and tumble political process of 
coercion and concession. 
I Housing Policy Before 1948: the Rise and Fall of Faganite Paternalism 
Before 1936, most blacks in Uitenhage resided in four proclaimed locations: Kabah 
(the oldest and largest), Doornhoek, Gubbs, and Oatlands (Table l), situated 
respectively to the north, west, south, and east of town (Map 1). The Municipality 
could not upgrade housing nor bear the cost of administering four geographically 
separate and dispersed locations without taking the politically difficult step of 
adding to the deficit on the Native Revenue Account. Between 1936 and 1938 the 
Municipality consolidated the communities by forcing residents to move to Kabah. 
Table 1: Uitenhage Population Growth 1921-36; Locations Population, 1935 4 
Race 1921 1936 Kabah Gubbs Doornhoek Oatlands Location Total 
African 3187 6588 3411 866 649 840 5766 
Coloured 3052 4334 1820 136 262 746 2964 
White 7815 9437 -- --- -- --- ---- 
The Municipality had hoped to make Kabah into a "model locationf1, but by 
promoting self-built housing with material loaned to residents at rates they could 
not afford, Kabah developed along the same lines as before: overcrowded wattle-and- 
daub structures and few services. During the war Municipal officials discussed a 
variety of housing options for Kabah, including removal of Coloureds from the 
Location to prevent flintermixinglf and the illegal liquor distribution to Africans, 
provision of sub-economic housing schemes, possible removal of the Location, and 
extension of freehold title to Africans. 
The Post-War Period 
In early 1945 the Council took two steps to secure the town's position in the 
post-war period, hiring a consultant to devise a general town plan and an agent to 
scout prospective industrial investors. The Council hired T B Floyd as its planning 
consultant, based on his reputa ion as one of the foremost participants in the town 5 planning movement of the 1940s. Floydls planning vision was more comprehensive 
than that of the local officials, and SW risingly conformed very closely to the 
principles of the future Group Areas Act. B 
Floyd recommended moving Africans to Sandfontein, a municipally owned farm 
east of town, to be close to the heavy-labour railway workshops and planned 
industrial zone, while Coloureds would remain in an upgraded Kabah, close to the 
wool washeries and a planned textile mill. But his argument for removing Kabah was 
immediately attacked by various Councillors, and ultimately rejected. Councillor 
M S Ofsowitz, a local physician, pointed out that, as Africans had been moved into 
Kabah in the 1930s so that administration and amenities could be improved, it was 
unreasonable now to consider moving the locatvn. Instead of moving the location, 
he said, housing in Kabah should be improved. 
After resolving to upgrade Kabah, the Council sought funds from the 
National Housing and Planning Commission to develop a sub-economic housing scheme. 
The project, expected ultimately to include 2,000 semi-detached units, was approved 
by the Government in early 1948. The Council also hoped to have a Iflarge portionff 
of the town commonage surveyed and set out as freehold residential plots for 
Africans, and to receive fundsgfor a sub-economic housing scheme for Coloureds 
immediately adjacent to Kabah. But, even as the Council developed a programme of 
development rather self-consciously along the lines of the Fagan Report, its own 
industrial programme was generating conditions which would foil the best efforts at 
control. 
Between 1945 and 1946 the Councilfs industrial drive yielded astounding 
results. A number of large companies decided to locate in Uitenhage, including 
Goodyear, Fine Wool Products (financed by the Industrial Development Corporation), a 
tanning company, and another textile firm. The SAR&H expanded the existing railway 
workshops, and in 1946 South African Motor Assemblers and Distributors (SAMAD), the 
forerunner of Volkswagen South Africa, formed to produce Studebakers. The town's 
fortunes, linked to the Cape Midlands hinterland and to external markets since the 
widespread development of wool production in the 19th century, were now tied firmly 
to the premier twentieth century international growth industry. 
The immediate effect of the boom was to provide employment, especially for 
blacks. For the Port Elizabeth-Uitenhage metropolitan area, total black industrial 
employment increased from 35.8 per cent of the industrial work-force in 1935/36 to 
56 per cent in 1949/50. In absolute terms, the black industrial work-force 
incre~ed from 4,288 in 1935/36 to 17,215 in 1949/50, an increase of over 400 per 
cent. Though no figures are available for Uitenhage alone, there is little reason 
to doubt that the same dramatic increase occurred in the town as in w e  metropolitan 
region as a whole. An extremely rough estimatflof the town's black industrial work- 
force in 1949/50 would be approximately 2,600. 
The industrial work-force thus increased at a much faster rate than the 
black population as a whole. The African population more than doubled between 1936 
and 1951, with the greatest growth coming in the five years after the war when the 
new factories came on line (Table 2). The increases occurred despite the 
introduction of limited influx controls in 1933. The growth in the African 
population was part of a general migration to the town, which included a sham 
increase in the Coloured and white population as well. 
Table 2: Uitenhage Population Growth 1936-1951 12 
- -  
Race 1936 1946 1951 Annual Percentage Increase 
1936-1946 1946-1951 
African 6,588 10,016 16,942 
Coloured 4 , 334 4,958 7,161 
White 9,437 11,015 14,272 
A small town with few amenities, Uitenhage was none the less a place where 
a person could find a job. The Municipal Departmental Committee of Enquiry into the 
Administration of Kabah found that "where there is a demand for Native labour ... 
the Native labour required in excess of the local supply infiltrates into the urban 
area ... with complete disregard for any proclamations to the contraryt1. Such 
processes were natural, "and without turning a location into a concentration camp, 
it seems impossible to prevent it". l$ndeed, the Committee favoured the repeal of 
the old influx control proclamation. 
The population of Kabah swelled, and the number of Africans in town 
doubled from 1,177 in 1947 to 2,127 in 1951, as families crowded into lodgings in 
the western end of town. The Municipality registered 400 lodgers in the Location, 
and issued plots for Africans to erect shacks in a "stopgap11 emergency camp. 
The Council had to act quickly to start the 1946 housing programme, where 
it had hoped to demolish sub-standard dwellings in Kabah and rehouse the occupants 
in formal Municipally-built structures. "This laudable objectnt, wrote the 
Departmental Executive Committee, "is however rapidly receding towards the horizon 
again, as it now seems that all the houses the Council will be able to erect in the 
next five or ten years will be fully taken up to provide for the large existing 
colony of odger families and for the swarms of newcomers hovering on our 
borders." In the months before the National Party electoral victory, it became 
clear to many members that the Council's new housing plan could not accommodate the 
burgeoning population. 
Table 3: Black Population Growth: Kabah Location and Town, 1947-1951 15 
Race Kabah 
1947 1951 
Town 
1947 1951 
African 9,729 14,172 l, 177 2,127 
Coloured 3,418 4,258 2,052 2,426 
Total 13,165 18,556 3,891 5,431 
11. 1948 and Beyond: the Central State, the Council and the Implementation of 
Apartheid 
Councillors hoped the national housing question would soon be solved along lines 
amenable to their outlook: that the Fagan recommendations would be given statutory 
force upon the re-election of the UP Government. But the 1948 election changed the 
political calculus almost completely. The narrow national electoral victory cleared 
the way for enactment of the NP apartheid legislation. Notwithstanding recent 
debates on the status of the Sauer report, urban policies af@r 1948 were not merely 
a function of the political struggles over migratory labour. Municipalities and 
the Government were forced to develop initiatives to reorder, redistribute, and 
control urban populations as a whole, whether migratory or settled, African or 
"non-Af rican" . 
The most important single act affecting the future of urban areas was the 
Group Areas Act (No 41 of 1950). In repealing a patchwork of provincial 
legislation, the Act sought a comprehensive system of segregation which would affect 
all race "groups", including whites, by imposing control throughout South Africa~) 
over inter-racial property transactions and int-er-racial changes of occupation. 
The law depended on the prior identification of every citizen in terms of the 
Population Registration Act. It then specified a series of stages through which 
control over areas would be tightened, leading to the ultimate declaration of full 
group areas, racially pure in ownership and occupation. The Land Tenure Advisory 
Board was given extremely broad powers under amendments to the Act; a legislative 
hold-over from the siatic Land Tenure Act, the LTAB was later reconstituted as the 
Group Areas Board. 18 
But the Act must be seen in the context of the evolving web of apartheid 
legislation. If the Urban Areas Act carried the authority for segregating Africans, 
the Group Areas Act defined how African areas were to be sited vis-a-vis other 
racially defined sections, and how Coloured, Indian and White areas would be 
situated vis-a-vis each other. In combination, the two Acts created enormous 
problems for the Municipality. 
Kabah - where it was planned at all - developed according to a vision 
quite at odds with the apartheid framework. By 1951 the 4,200 Coloured residents of 
Kabah made up nearly a quarter of the Location populationlpd accounted for more 
than 60 per cent of the Coloured population of Uitenhage. The remainder of the 
Coloured residents lived in the town itself, interspersed with poor Whites and 
Africans in the older western sections. On its eastern side, the Location was 
separated from the white sections of town by a single street, while another road on 
its south-western side divided Kabah from the proposed Coloured sub-economic scheme 
which the Council had been shepherding through the national bureaucracy since 1947. 
The difference between the legal ideal and the intractable conditions on the ground 
defined the terms of the local political struggle over national urban policies. 
As a first step toward achieving its national goals, the Government 
enacted subtle, but extremely important, changes in its legal relationship with 
local authorities. Under the 1945 Act, the Governor-General was empowered to 
proclaim controls on African entry into an urban zea Itif requested to do so by a 
resolution ... of any urban local authority ...lf. Some municipalities, such as 
Port Elizabeth, had opted out of the system, and remained an "open city". 
The Native Laws Amendment Act (No 54 of 1952) reversed the scope of 
application of influx control: rather than being applied only where local 
authorities had requested it, influx control was automatically instituted throughout 
the Union. Under the new law, the local authority was limited to asking the 
Government for an exemption from the universal policy of influx control, and even 
then the Government could exercise discretion in responding. The same Act provided 
for a compulsory national labour bureau system for all urban and rural ar !?BS 
repealing a 1949 provision for voluntary establishment of labour bureaux. Almost 
with the stroke of a pen local authorities were stripped of an extremely important 
statutory power, while influx control was legally, though not yet in practice, 
extended from a piecemeal programme to a national system. 
As a second step, the government shuffled the bureaucracies responsible 
for specific urban policies. The impact of the shifts quickly became clear to local 
officials. In late 1951 the Town Clerk received notification from the Secretary for 
Native Affairs in Pretoria that the Municipality's proposed Coloured sub-economic 
housing scheme woy3d be delayed, owing to its "close proximity to the proclaimed 
Native location". The scheme was sited outside the African area, in compliance 
with the Urban Areas Act (1945), but was just across the road from the Location, in 
violation of the new Group Areas Act. 
S B Featherstone, the Town Clerk, was incredulous. The Department and the 
Municipality both sought separation of Africans and Coloureds in Kabah. "And .vet YOU 
tell us sw&arily that the proposed site for a Coloured Housing scheme-is no good 
because it is too near the Native Location. Under existing conditions Coloureds and 
Natives live together in the Location. Surely it is better to develop a separate 
area for Coloureds alon@.de the Location even if it is near the Location.'' 
(Emphasis in original.) 
The Town Clerk's anger was heightened because the Council, as in the past, 
expected rapid approval. Only four days before receipt of the Secretary's letter 
the Town Clerk received a formal circular announcing that NAD now had authority to 
review %C plans and possessed veto power over the choice of sites for housing 
schemes. Previously such power was lodged in the NIiPC. Not only did the 
Municipality confront a new, and somewhat bewildering, rearrangement of bureaucratic 
forces, but the day before the Secretary's letter was written the Town Clerk had 
received an undertaking from the Technical Adviser to the NHPC that he would 
personally $&scuss the matter of the Coloured Housing Scheme with the Native Affairs 
Department. 
In January 1952 the Council reached agreement with the Commissioner for 
Coloured Affairs and NAD on the provision of a buffer strip between the proposed 
Coloured scheme and the Location. But the housing scheme was still stalled, and the 
Town Clerk repeated that the delays were due2&o the multiplicity of government 
agencies whose authorizations were required. Over 2,000 people would have to be 
removed and 300 houses demolished to make way for the buffer strip, which the Town 
Clerk referred to as "the task which the Government Departments concerned have 
imp0629 upon the Council in return for the right to build a Coloured Housing Scheme 
...'I. 
If the fight over buffer strips was the preliminary bout, application of 
the Group Areas Act was the main event. The Land Tenure Advisory Board began wooing 
the Council in 1951. As a first step the Council accepted the task of conducting a 
survey of t9g town to establish the precise racial character of ownership and 
occupation. 
On 17 October 1951, by Proclamation No 220 of 1951, the entire Cape 
Province was declared a Itspecified area" in terms of the Group Areas Act. The 
proclamation introduced lloccupational controlf1 and "control of acquisition" such 
that no one could acquire ownership of a property from an owner of a different 
group, nor could anyone occupy property which had been occupied by a person of a 
different group prior to the proclamation. The proclamation essentially froze 
existing conditions. 
For the next year the Municipality refused to take the initiative in a 
series of minor dealings with LTAB. Then, in August 1953, the Secretary of the LTAB 
in Cape Town asked the Council whether it had reconsiders8 its position on the next 
stage of implementation, declaration of I1definedfv areas. In defined areas the 
level of control over tfinterpenetration" would be increased: unoccupied property 
could not be built upon nor existing buildings extended without ministerial 
approval. 
The step was particularly difficult for the Council; "specifiedt1 areas, 
the freeze on inter-racial changes of ownership and occupation, were established at 
once by province-wide proclamation in which the Council had no part. But because 
municipal officials possessed the most accurate understanding of conditions on the 
ground, the government expected them to play a major role in "definingtv properties 
owned or occupied by individuals of one race in an area dominated by another. By 
participating in efforts to define areas the Council itself would directly harm 
vested interests in the town, especially black businesses in white areas. At the 
end of August the Finance and General Purposes Committee decided to accept the 
LTABts request and directed the Town Clerk to report to the Committee any cases of 
I1possible penetration". 
But a most startling parliamentary manoeuvre began at the next full 
Council meeting, where the members were to vote on the Finance and General Purposes 
Committee recommendation. During the meeting the Council received an urgent letter 
from the Uitenhage Indian Congress, asking the Council to refrain from making any 
decision ogOthe question to allow the Congress time to study the Committee's 
proposals. Three of the four authors were shop-owners, including a 
Mr A S Kooverjee; the Vice-Chairman, D R Lalla, owned four properties. Councillor 
H J Ofsowitz, the brother (?) of the physician who had so successfully fought 
T B Floydvs plan to move Kabah in 1945, moved that the matter be referred back to 31 
the Finance and General Purposes Committee, and the Council passed the motion 8-6. 
At its next meeting the Committee received the deputation from the 
Uitenhage Indian Congress, including four shop-owners accompanied by an attorney. 
The group stressed "the cordial relations which have always existed between the 
Indian community and other sections of the community in Uitenhage", and said that 
the Indians living or trading in town had been present there 39r more than fifty 
years, a presence which they did not regard as "penetrationtv. The group explained 
that since the Act placed sole authority for racial zoning in the hands of the LTAB, 
which would eventually make its own representations to the Minis&, "the Council 
should wait until this happens and not take the initiative .lt. After 
considering the deputation's arguments, the Committee decided that the Council 
should defer the matter indefinitely "to remove any suspicion on the part of the 
non-European sections of the community that the Council is acting against their 
interests .l1 The ext week the Committee's new recomendation was carried by the 
full Council 9 'to 5. 32 
The LTAB approached the Council again in June 1954, but in two years of 
debate Councillors could not decide whether Ifto take the initiative to see that 
people were treated in the most humane way po~sible~~ or to refuse to participate in 
applying a la~~likely to cause the "economic strangulation of the Chinese and Indian 
traders .lv. When neither the full Council nor a special subcommittee could 
break the deadlock, members essentially threw up their hands. In March 1956, by a36 
vote of 9-5, the Council decided to "leave the problem to be handled by the LTABnv. 
The position became the official policy of the Council for the next six years. 
At the meeting in October 1953, when the Council originally rejected co- 
operation following the protest by the Uitenhage Indian Congress, the leading NP 
member, Councillor F D Conradie, reminded the members that Indians were but one per 
cent of the town's population. Speaking in Afrikaans, he "could not understand why 
the committee had so quickly turned around as a result of formal objection against 
the move which had been put forward by the Indian community1'. Indeed, why did the 
Council reverse itself after meeting a single Indian organization? 
The Act would surely cause hardships, and the Councillors knew that they 
would fall most heavily on a small but important group: Indian, Chinese, and 
Coloured businessmen. Councillors could rationalize residential segregation on the 
grounds that hardships inflicted on blacks by removal were minimized because 
families would receive a better house than what they had left behind in Kabah; 
indeed, well-to-do Coloureds could purchase a plot in the new ~ubilee Park scheme. 
But the limits on ownership and occupancy threatened to deal a mortal blow to the 
economic well-being of those owning businesses in town. 
In a 1959 survey, the Municipality identified 34 Chinese and 29 Indians as 
property owners in the town. These 63 people owned approximately 100 properties 
with a rateable value of more than 200,00037 A 1955 survey identified more than 340 
black-owned dwellings and nearly 80 shops. 
Many of the Councillors were themselves businessmen. While class standing 
is hardly a conclusive indicator of sympathy for tlnon-whitell business interests, a 
core of a half-dozen English-speaking businessmen consistently opposed application 
of the Act. Curiously, the two UP members voting for the Government were both 
professionals, a lawyer and the publisher-editor of the local paper. The white 
businessmen shared at least two commitments: to the industrial development of the 
town and to the promotion of commerce. The assault on black business not only 
violated important market principles but undermined some friendships and not a few 
professional relationships spanning decades. 
Finally, whites owned at least 107 dwellings and 18 shops in likely 
Coloured, Indian, Chinese, or Malay Group Areas; these owners would obviously 
suffer hardships under the Act. Thus the holdings of a number of individuals - 
black and white - were rendered insecure. To expropriate all or part of these 
properties the Council would lose part of its tax base, be forced to pay 
compensation, and face the prospect of lengthy and costly Litigation. 
But Indian, Chinese, and Coloured businessmen not only owned property. 
They could also vote. Though in 1956 the NP succeeded in its protracted 
constitutional battle to remove Coloureds from the parliamentary voters' rghl, they 
did not fully disenfranchise Coloureds, at least not in the Cape Province. Unlike 
Natal, the Cape maintained separate voters' rolls for parliamentary and for 
municipal elections; when Coloureds were removed from the parliamentary roll, they 
remained on municipal rolls and eligible to vote in local elections. 
Figures for the number of "non-white" voters from 1959 refer to the 
Coloured population, which more than likely would have included other "non-whitew 
voters. The survey listed 5,015 white munic3gal voters and 950 Coloureds, amounting 
to 16 per cent of the registered electorate. In a town where working-class 
Afrikaners represented a larger and larger slice of the white electorate, a UP 
Councillor ould be ill advised to threaten Indian, Coloured, or Chinese 
intere~ts.~' The Uitenhage Indian Congress and other bodies had special access to 
the Council, not because of their numbers but because of their economic influence 
and political weight. 
Policy Towards Africans 
African residents of Uitenhage faced a very different situation. As described 
above, much of the room for local discretion had been removed in the drafting of the 
new national legislation. In January 1951 the Natives Affairs Committee, chaired by 
the liberal Councillor Ernest Rens, had resolved not to apply those elements of 
Governmenttfjllabour control where local authorities were still allowed a measure of 
compliance. 
It was not mandatory for Uitenhage to apply the Native Services Levy Act, 
as the original law (Act No 64 of 1952, section $4 applied automatically only to 
towns with-more than 20,000 African inhabitants. The Council did not desire 
proclamation of the Act in the town, as local industry was extremely hostile to its 
provisions; representatives of the largest firms in town along with the Director of 
the Midland Chamber of Industries threatened $9 institute a large-scale shift to 
Coloured workers, should the levy be imposed. While Councillor Tom Fowlds, 
serving as Mayor in 1956-57, expected the law wouB be applied "sooner or latertt, 
the Council applied to be exempted from the levy. 
The NAD eventually took a hard line on the Native Services Levy, but only 
as part of a larger power play: the removal of Kabah. The Location's future had 
been a non-issue since the Council commitment to upgrading in 1945/46. But, in July 
1957, Mr Brownlee, Chief Native Commissioner for the Eastern Cape, bluntly informed 
the Council that under new Department policy no housing loans would be granted to a 
local authority whose location did not conform to buffer-strip requirements. A 
500-yard buffer strip would be required between Kabah and e White suburb and 
between the Location and the Coloured sub-economic scheme. The Municipality had 
not cleared the buffer zones in 1952 when it was ordered to move 1,800 persons and 
300 dwellings. Now the NAD was demarcating a far larger buffer zone, which would 
necessitate moving the most ggnsely settled sections of the Location: over 11,100 
persons and 1,242 dwellings. 
But Brownlee had something else in mind. Rather than go to the expense of 
creating a buffer strip, which would involve extensive compensation to those moved 
while leaving Kabah in place, the Council, he suggested, should consider moving the 
entire location. Brownlee recommended that the new location be sited in to the 
south, close to the industrial areas, and Kabah could be deproclaimed and the land 
used for Coloured housing. The Chief Native Commissioner, perhaps unconsciously, 
fully resuscitated T B Floyd's 1945 town planning recommendations. 
To sweeten the pot, Brownlee offered to delay for one year the extension 
of the Native Services Levy Act to Uitenhage. Even so, the Council rejected the 
unsolicited advice from Native Affairs. By a U) to 4 vote the Cayncil resolved that 
the resiting of the Kabah Location would be quite impracticable. 
It did not take long for the other shoe to drop. In return for the 
Council's action and without any warning, NAD announced in late October that 
Uitenhage was an area in which the provisions of the Native Services Levy Act would 
apply retroactively as from 1 October. The Town Clerk applied to the Department to 
extend the period, as officials had no means to begin collecting the levy. Brownlee 
responded that an extension could not be granted and that arrear service contract 
fees would have to be collected from business as from the begi~ing of October or 
the Municipality would be held l&ble for any arrears in the Native Revenue Account 
owing to the uncollected monies. 
The Council quickly got to work investigating the resiting of Kabah. In 
August 1958, after weighing the potential costs to the Municipality of the various 
options, the Cauncil resolved in principle to acquire a farm south-east of the town 
for a new African location. The Town Clerk stated the Council's motives most 
succinctly: "the Council basically has no particular concern as to whether the 
Location remains on its presex& site, or is resited ... the issue now has come down 
to one purely of finance ..." 
After a lengthy dispute about which farm to purchase, the renamed Bank 
Affairs Department stepped in and persuaded the Council to purchase the farms 
ntBoschoogtelt and ItNaroeslt. In a meeting with the council the Under-Secretary of 
BAD, Mr Louis Smuts, indicated that the Council should relocate the present African 
location and reserve the old site for Coloured housing. As for any unanticipated 
costs, he assured the Councillors that the Department had in the past been able to 
overcome any financial difficulties involved in resiting. "If the Council and the 
Department worked together", he said I1t& problem which ayppeared to be a major one 
would not be found to be so difficult1!. 
The Council continued to delay. Some members favoured one site, others 
another, some wanted to retain the old location. All were worried about embarking 
on a project riskier than any ever attempted by the Council. Smuts returned for 
another session of the Council-in-Committee in November 1960, and laid down the law. 
The old location was poorly sited in relation to the overall plan of Uitenhage; it 
had to go. l'... The Department", he informed the Councillors, "would under no 
circwyPances allow the Kabah Location to be extended and another site had to be 
found. Councillor Rens now stood alone as the only member advocating retaining 
Kabah at its present site. In January 1961, the Council reversed its decision of 
1945 and subsequent determinations regarding Kabah, and agreed to remove the 
Location. 
In contast to the earlier deliberations on the application of Group Areas 
to Uitenhage, the decisions regarding resiting of Kabah were made behind closed 
doors, in secret sessions of the Council. Whereas prominent members of the 
Coloured, Indian, and Chinese committees had the opportunity to address the 
Councillors, the Council welcomed no representatives of the African people. 
That is not to imply that the African residents of Uitenhage had no 
representatives. The town was a stronghold of the African National Congress 
throughout the decade, and was one of the organizationls most active branches in the 
Cape. Councillors and Municipal officials were generally hostile towards the 
Congress, with the notable exception of Councillor Rens, chairman of the Native 
Affairs Committee. 
When the Cape Province Congress of the ANC was held at Kabah on 26 June 
1954 (addressed by Professor Z K Matthews, Dr Luthuli, and Walter Sisulu), the 
Council debated whether to allow the ANC access to the Location Hall. Rens *Ipointed 
out that the African National Congress was in any event holding weekly meetings in 
the open in the Location and th@ as this was not an illegal organisation their 
meetings could not be stopped1'. The Council allowed the meeting to proceed, but 
there were no official meetings scheduled between the Municipal hosts and their 
notable guests. 
Rensts position became incresingly unpopular. Congress protests sharpened 
as NAD tightened influx control. Throughout July and August 1957, Kabah residents 
repeatedly clashed with the SAP, which was protecting a unit distributing the new 
passes. Women led numerous protests, and more than 120 were arrested on four 
separate occasions. On 29 July 21 women were charged with !!assault and obstructing 
the policel1 after marching to the Uitenhage court house, where they publicly burned 
their passes; they were given extremely heavy fines. 
Where Indian and Chinese organizations had been able to influence Council 
policy directly, African organizations, especially the ANC, could mobilize large 
constituencies throughout the 'fifties but could not gain the ear of the Council. 
As their suffering grew under the repressive central state policies increasingly 
being enforced through the Municipality, African residents mouthed more direct forms 
of protest to apartheid. In contrast to both the way it handled the Group Areas 
legislation and the manner in which it discussed T B Floydls 1945 recommendations 
for removing Kabah, the Council agreed to the main lines of NAD policy without 
concern for the interests of those most affected, especially once the Government 
eased the Council's fiscal burden. 
When the Secretary of the East Cape Committee of the Group Areas Board 
(the transformed LTAB) saw press reports in mid-1961 that the Council had agreed&o 
resite Kabah, he wrote to the Town Clerk to wage one final group areas campaign. 
Since Kabah would eventually be cleared, plenty of prime land would be opened up for 
possible Coloured settlement. The thorny group areas problem could be simplified. 
On 17 July 1961 the Council met to consider his request and Councillor 
Rens managed to push through a resolution declaring "that the Council does not wish 
to discuss the question ... or to submit proposals .l1 as it was occupied with 
plans to resite the African location. 
lfCouncil snubs Group Areas Boardw, wrote the Sunday Times, while the 
Evening Pos3 editorialized that "Most Councillors have stood firm against the great 
hardships which compulsory racial grouping would bringvq. But the pro-Government Die 
Oosterliq interpreted events differently. "The constituency in which the town lies 
has sent representatives of apartheid to the Assembly and Provincial Council. The 
majority in the City Council is therefore a mere island in the political sea." The 
editorial concluded: ItqRegfer unto Caesar that which is Caesar's' is a good idea 
for them to bear in mind.Iq 
The Afrikaans daily had a far clearer reading of the prevailing balance of 
political power. Though the NP held only three out of fifteen seats on the Council, 
the local UP councillors could hardly claim to be representing the popular will when 
their national party was being consistently beaten in election after election. In 
February 1962 Die Oosterliq reported a speech by P W Botha to the Cape Town meeting 
of the United Municipal Executive. Botha, then Minister of Coloured Affairs, 
Community Development, and Housing, referred to the municipalities which refused to 
co-operate on Group Areas: "How long do these caretake~g think they will hold their 
positions to wage their battle against the g~vernment?~ 
A few months later, in June 1962, the Council, without opposition, 
accepted a resolution to submit Group Areas proposals to the Department of Community 
Development. An agreement was possible once a compromise had been forged to reduce 
the hardships for Indian and Chinese traders. The proposal came from a local firm 
of Afrikaner lawyers, one of whom, G g6Pieterse, had served on the Council, and was 
a leader of the Afrikaanse Sakekamer. Pieterse advised the Council to petition 
the government to declare a free trade zone, allowing "non-white" businesses to 
continue in some form. He developed the strategy while preparing an application for 
a local Indian businessman who sought a Group Areas permit. Ironically, Pieterse's 
client was A S Kooverjee, the landowner, businessman, and member of the Uitenhage 
Indian Congress delegation which successfully pressured the Council to reverse 
itself in 1953 and refuse to co-operate with the LTAB. 
From 1962 until proclamation of Group-Areas in Uitenhage on 20 October 
1967, the Council co-operated with the Government. A familiar argument served as 
justification for its action: if the Council does not act "the Government will 57 
intervene ... and impose something far more drastic for the victims of the actw. 
By "trying not to be cruel", as the Evening Post put it, the Council reversed its 
long-standing position of non-compliance with a centrepiece of apartheid 
legislation. A n  era of municipal contestation of apartheid policy had come to a 
close. 
Conclusions 
Councillors had consistently framed their choices as either non-cooperation with an 
unjust policy, or working within the legal framework to apply the harsh regulations 
as fairly as possible: Iqtrying not to be cruel". At the end of the day, local 
defensive battles could delay but not reverse central policy. Faced by a central 
state willing to wield new resources in an effort to gain control, local officials 
accepted the second option, to work within the rules of the game as established by 
the W ,  fearing that, as in Johannesburg and Cape Town, policies would be forced 
upon them. These rules were as much ideological as legal or bureaucratic, and they 
became the basic framework within which the Council would pursue policy towards 
Africans and Coloureds until the 1980s. 
In playing by the rules, however, the Council was aided by a compromise 
which carefully excluded the one group towards which Councillors could least afford 
to be cruel. Coloureds, Indians, and Chinese businessman and property owners had 
access to the Council by virtue of property and the franchise, and they used their 
assets at key points to influence the Council. For Africans, no such bonds existed 
to the Council or to the state. Possessing neither property nor the vote, they had 
little to offer to the Council. Housing policy for Africans was decided behind 
closed doors where economic efficiency and the tax burden to be borne by the (mostly 
white) ratepayers were the only factors taken into account. 
Not only did the Council agree to virtually the same policy they had 
rejected when it was suggested in 1945 by their own expert town planning consultant, 
but they revived another legacy of the town's past. By purchasing the farms 
ffBoschoogtew and "NaroesN for the site of Kwanobuhle, they unknowingly sited the new 
township, "Place of Beautyft, on land used as a concentration camp during the Anglo- 
Boer War. 
The second theme of the paper concerns the growing centra1,state control 
over local affairs, particularly over the reproduction of the urban black 
populations. Before 1948 the Council was relatively unhindered by the central state 
in its efforts or (more accurately) non-efforts to house blacks; in practice, the 
relative freedom meant inaction, as neither the Council nor the Government would 
supply sufficient funds for upgrading black communities. But through the 19508, and 
especially after 1957, the space for local opposition narrowed considerably. The 
paper identifies three main factors: first, the central state formally narrowed the 
scope of municipal statutory discretion in implementing central policies; second, 
it began to exert greater bureaucratic pressure on councils by reorganizing lines of 
authority; third, the new bureaucratic machinery and the political will to use it 
gave the central state much greater power to manipulate local authorities' fiscal 
dependence, thus enabling it to buy compliance. 
In the end, however, the central state was able to force local authorities 
to comply with apartheid policy, but it could not remake the world according to its 
image. The Council's stalling efforts unintentionally succeeded in delaying 
proclamation of Group Areas in Uitenhage until 1967 (six years after Port Elizabeth, 
even though Uitenhage presented far fewer planning problems), and the removal of the 
Kabah Location did not start until 1968. Both projects were consistently delayed, 
so that through the 1970s there were still parts of town where Coloureds and 
Africans lived either in the same area or very close together. 
When the state was finally able to embark on the segregation project, it 
faced a new political economy which placed demands on local authorities not 
accommodated in the original legislation. As the UP Council had been caught in the 
late 1940s with-a dated solution unable to cope with contemporary problems, so, too, 
the Government's agenda for reorganizing urban residential and commercial space 
could not cope with changes brought about by the boom of the 1960s. In response to 
the Government's local content legislation for the automobile industry, hundreds of 
new motor components firms opened factories in South Africa, and a large number 
located in Uitenhage. The boom created thousands of new semi-skilled and artisanal 
jobs in the town, which were increasingly filled by black workers. 
At the very moment when Africans and Coloureds were moving into 
semi-skilled and skilled job positions in the expanding automobile industry, the 
state's segregation efforts stalled. The development of a modern industrial working 
class in Uitenhage occurred not on a terrain defined entirely by apartheid but in a 
confused, relatively uncontrolled manner which allowed possibilities for contact and 
co-ordination across racial lines at the work-place and, more importantly, in 
communities. 
For nearly two decades Kabah could not be emptied. The removals 
orchestrated by the new Administration Board came more and more to resemble a man 
transferring water with a fork: with the lure of industrial employment, the 
relaxation ofinflux control, declining rural conditions, and the refusal of the 
state to build new housing, thousands of people flocked to the emptied land of the 
old Location. By June 1986 there were as many residents in Kabah as when the 
removals began in 1968, and grassroots organizations were fighting to have the area 
upgraded. Then, between July and August 1986, aided by the crackdown on popular 
organizations under the second state of emergency, the state unleashed an assault on 
the revived Kabah Location. More than 40,000 people were forcibly removed to an 
, 
extension of Kwanobuhle Township. The Uitenhage Municipality, the local 
administration board, and the central state were still cruelly stumbling over 
segregation and relocation policies up to the present day. If the central state 
succeeded in consolidating and extending its power, in Poselts phrase, it was far 
less successful in using that power to achieve a grand apartheid plan. 
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